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Our Reserve Component: We Can Do More With Less

Colonel
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U.S. Marine Corps

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ABSTRACT

The United States has a history of entering conflicts ill prepared. The results of this lack of initial preparedness have been not only the senseless loss of lives but also making a foe more determined due to his initial battlefield success. Projected force drawdowns to a 1.6 or perhaps 1.4 million standing military will require the use of our Reserve Component to execute the crisis response or reconstitution missions of our national military strategy. Our Reserve Component must be capable of initial success in any type of conflict.

Policies by the executive branch, congress, DoD and the services must be altered to ensure the Reserve Component is ready when called. Prioritizing mobilization by service and units within services is required. The executive branch must make timely decisions. Congress must allow the services to structure their respective Reserve Components for combat effectiveness vice political sensitivity. DoD should allow the services access to all potential warfighters by presenting a comprehensive plan to congress on exactly what is required for a generic scenario and when it might be required. The services must organize their remaining warfighting assets, both active and reserve, for maximum flexibility and combat effectiveness.

All branches of the service can do a far better job of managing and training all personnel assets for rapid and sustained deployment/employment. This paper provides several recommendations to increase Total Force effectiveness by insuring our Reserve Component can make a significant contribution to warfighting.

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Our Reserve Component: We Can Do More With Less

**Colonel
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INTRODUCTION

The United States has a long history of insuring our standing military forces remain small. In our fight for independence, state militias were relied upon to contribute the bulk of our fighting forces. Immediately upon winning a victory over England, the army was reduced to caretaker troops (Benard Wilson 3). Our founding fathers wrote into our initial constitution, the right for all men to bear arms, negating the need for a large standing army. Citizens would again be called to war if our nation was threatened. The Militia Act of 1792 clearly established that states would provide for this country's defense and was explicit about when the federal government could mobilize this manpower.

Our civil war from 1861-1865 again finds individual states providing most of the manpower. The south found the idea of a standing national army so counter to their "states rights" belief that conscription did not occur. This fact alone kept winning the conflict nearly impossible for the South.

It wasn't until after World War I that the nation realized a strong navy and a capable standing army were required for national power. The strength of our forces after demobilization remained at about 100,000, small when compared to the standing forces elsewhere in the world. In September, 1939 when the decision was made to initiate a defense buildup, the active Army contained 187,000 members organized in twelve divisions. A mere three divisions were labeled combat ready (Martin Binkin and William Kaufman 38). Conversely, there were 200,000 National Guard members organized in eighteen divisions. There were an additional 120,000 members labeled as fillers for active forces.

The downside of this substantial reserve manpower pool was its mobilization status. Between July 1940 and June 1941 about 96,000 Guardsmen or 40% of the total strength, were discharged for the following reasons:

- * 50,000 E-1 to E-3's for dependents.
- * 3,700 were physically disqualified.

- * 4,400 were found to be in jobs critical to the war effort.

- * 5,000 were underage (Binkin and Kaufman 39).

In addition, all units were severely deficient in combat training and most had WWI weapons and equipment. Long delays in readiness to deploy overseas were the norm. Despite all these difficulties, reservists and conscripts were the bulk of over 12 million men and women that served in this war.

Reserves were mobilized for the Korean conflict. The difficulties encountered with mobilization were identical to those experienced in WWII, except the time frame required for mobilization was shortened. Four National Guard divisions were activated in September, 1950. They were found to be under equipped, undermanned, and poorly trained. Two infantry divisions were only 40 to 45 percent combat effective and they were the best of the group. Also, as in WWII, it was reservists and conscripts that provided the majority of the manpower required to bring that conflict to conclusion (Binkin and Martin 43).

The Reserve Component Today.

This Nation will reduce its standing armed forces from a peak of 2.3 million in 1987 to 1.6 or perhaps 1.4 million by 1997. To maintain our national military strategy with forward presence, deterrence, crisis response and reconstitution, 1.4 or even 1.6 million standing members is insufficient. Perhaps, by frequent deployments and long periods spent overseas, the first two missions may be met. The third and fourth missions will require the use of both our Active and Reserve Components. Can the Reserve Components in all branches of the armed forces accomplish these missions or will we repeat our WWII and Korean War mobilization experiences? Both the military services and our civilian leadership can insure history does not repeat itself. With improved policies by both sectors, we can enhance our Reserve Component's effectiveness.

SECTION I.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: The Reserve Component Is Mobilized.

The Gulf war in 1990 and 1991 is an excellent example in which to view Reserve Component mobilization and readiness. Unlike mobilizations for WWII and Korea, the United States had the option of choosing to mobilize its Reserve Component and time to mobilize in a managed fashion. I feel our Active Component could have handled the crisis without mobilization since less than 25 percent were actually deployed to the Gulf. Active forces were available in other theaters to redeploy to the area of conflict. Opting for the choice to call up the Reserve Component and time to execute, existing policies and decisions prohibited efficient mobilization. Those policies and decisions that need to be evaluated are:

1. Timeliness of decision to mobilize the Reserve Component.
2. Prohibition against mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve.
3. Prolonging the decision to execute stop/loss.
4. Incrementally authorizing mobilization.

Timeliness Of Mobilization Decision.

Deciding to mobilize the Reserve Component was the most difficult decision in my opinion. Mobilizing the Reserve Component means the Nation is at war. When Johnnie Jones is no longer the UPS delivery man and is now in the Persian Gulf, his family, friends and all those he delivered to became involved in the conflict. This concern for the nation-wide effects was President Johnson's primary reason for not mobilizing the Reserve Component during the Vietnam conflict. He wanted to maintain his "Great Society" program in a peace environment while the war was fought with increased conscription. In the Vietnam conflict, we had the luxury to increase the size of our standing military forces over years, vice months.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August, 1990. President Bush, through his Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Richard Cheney, did not give the authorization to mobilize the Reserve Component until 22 August (Stephen Duncan and Christopher Jehn 18). Three valuable weeks of identification, mobilization processing and enhanced desert training were lost on Reserve Component members, crucial to our initial warfighting capability. This will be discussed more thoroughly in section IV.

Incrementally Authorizing Mobilization.

Section 673b of Title 10, USC was enacted in 1974 to give the President authority to activate 50,000 selected reservists without the need for Congressional approval (Paul Chaloupa 1). This public law has been amended twice. In 1980, this authority was increased to 100,00 and in 1986 it was again raised to 200,000. Even with the authority to recall 200,000 selected reservists, Secretary Cheney limited the first call up to 48,500. This first call up also precluded the Army from mobilizing its combat units (Les Aspin and William Dickerson 50). Two increases in call up authority were issued: one on 14 November and the second on 1 December, 1990 raising the total final mobilization authority to 188,000.

This incremental call up authority caused the services two problems. With each service given a specific call up ceiling, planners were required to make units fit the ceiling vice mobilizing units that were required. If a specific unit was needed, but its strength plus the number of members already mobilized exceeded the ceiling, either that unit could not be recalled or only part of the unit could be mobilized. The second problem was the unknown number of the total mobilization ceiling that would be authorized eventually. If the Army had known that it's final mobilization total would be 115,000 vice the 25,000 authorized in the initial callup, units like water purification companies could have been mobilized early, knowing authorization for other combat and combat support units would follow. With its initial 14,500 personnel callup, the Air Force mobilized personnel to support airlift. The additional 5,500

personnel mobilized were A-10 and F-16 units that could've had additional training days and possibly an annual training duty to prepare for mobilization. Being alerted three months in advance and not mobilized may be far better than being mobilized quickly when additional authority is granted. A reserve member can plan job absence, family separation and perhaps monetary differences. Although there was close coordination between the service secretaries and Secretary of Defense on the ceilings, the services could never count on or plan using their numbers until they had officially been approved.

Implementing Stop/Loss.

The Department of Defense recruits over 200,000 recruits annually (J. L. Manis). Although not a precise figure due to heavy enlistment in the summer months, this roughly equates to 17,000 inductees and 17,000 discharges per month. The discharges are primarily noncommissioned officers and junior officers--our experienced, front line, small unit leader. The decision to institute stop/loss did not occur until 12 October, 1990. If stop/loss would have been enacted on 3 August, 1990, approximately 34,000 experienced, small unit leaders would have been available for Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) vice discharged. Recruit depots and officer candidate schools do not produce seasoned leaders. They are made with time and experience. This officer lost his communications chief, three additional staff noncommissioned officers, five of sixty tank commanders and two junior officers, while in the sands of Saudi Arabia, poised to repel five Iraqi divisions capable of attacking south. This was due to end of enlistment and replacement for those in other theaters that were discharged. They did not have to be lost. The Marine Corps policy was business as usual.

What Is A Reservist?

There are three basic categories of Reserve Component personnel:

1. Ready Reserve
2. Standby Reserve
3. Retired Reserve

The ready reserve is the only category of the Reserve Component that will be addressed since their skills and age are commensurate with the difficulties of combat.

There are two categories of ready reservists. Members of the Reserve Component belonging to a unit that conduct a minimum of 24 or 48 annual drills and an annual training duty of at least fourteen days are called selected reservists. They are authorized to be mobilized under Presidential authority and were recalled for the Gulf war. These recalled reservists performed stateside duties, deployed out of theater to relieve Active Component units who redeployed to the Gulf and deployed to the Gulf as rear area units or saw combat with their Active Component brothers. The Individual Ready Reserve or IRR, are Reserve Component members who are fulfilling the remaining reserve obligation of their active duty contract, between assignments in drilling units or fill a billet that does not allow a paid drill status. These members are not authorized for callup under the President's 200,000 man mobilization authority.

Reserve Component Contributions To The Gulf War.

The Reserve Component played a significant part in the Gulf War. As mentioned previously, members served across the spectrum of conflict. Use of the Reserve Component forces varied by service and branch of service. Services across the board experienced recall response percentages above the ninety-fifth percentile. This conflict clearly demonstrated the Reserve Component is a much more capable force than it was in WWII or Korea. A brief review of the services' reserve contributions will highlight those capabilities.

Air Force. The Air Force depends upon its Reserve Component to meet its strategic lift requirement in times of crisis. Although only authorized 14,500 members in its initial 22 August callup, more than twice that number had volunteered to serve. The then Military Airlift Command (MAC), had half

of all the Reserve Component members recalled. The first MAC aircraft to land in theater had an all Reserve Component crew. Forty percent of MAC missions and thirty-three percent of aerial refueling missions were flown by reserve crews during the month of August, 1990 (Les Aspin and William Dickerson 69). The then Tactical Air Command (TAC), mobilized two F-16, and one A-10 squadron after the ceiling was increased the second time. These squadrons were employed with their Active Component during Desert Storm. Their equipment and level of training were compatible with their active duty brothers.

Navy. The Navy activated 20,000 of 30,000 Reserve Component members authorized. Vice units, the Navy activated reservists for their individual skills. One half of all individuals mobilized were in the Medical Corps. Reserve Component members helped staff both the two deployed hospital ships and backfilled CONUS hospitals that had deployed active duty individuals to man the two ships and field hospitals. One half of the bed space in Central Command was provided by the Navy (Aspin and Dickerson 71).

Army. At the height of the conflict one hundred and forty-five thousand Guard and Reserve personnel were activated or volunteered (Aspin and Dickerson 53). Sixteen thousand reservists were in combat units assigned as roundout battalions and brigades. The initial prohibition against mobilizing combat units eliminated the use of the "roundout" concept (Aspen and Dickerson 54). This negated a two decade long expectation that Active and Reserve Component forces will go to war together. Eight of nine truck companies were mobilized along with eight of nine Guard evacuation hospitals. All six water purification units were mobilized. Seventy-one of one hundred and nineteen military police units received and answered the call.

Army mobilization did not meet expectations. The Honorable Les Aspin and William Dickerson report that between August and November, fifteen percent of units activated were C-4. Between November and January, the number increased to thirty-four percent. Not one roundout brigade deployed to Saudi Arabia in

the first ninety days.

The reason for these poor statistics was false reporting. All roundout brigades are suppose to be C-1--none were. A hospital unit was reporting C-2 but the unit had none of its required twelve doctors. A roundout brigade had reported C-2 but was short 179 mechanics and possessed little equipment. Individual units and their higher headquarters had inflated ratings to impress superiors (Aspin and Dickerson 58). Sections III and IV will address steps that both have been and should be taken to minimize this performance in the future.

Marine Corps. The Corps mobilized the highest percentage of its Reserve Component, almost two thirds. Some reserve units deployed to other theaters to relieve Active Component units. A major Northern European exercise was conducted by a Reserve Component task force during DS/DS. Four infantry battalions, one and a half tank battalions, one artillery regiment and five aircraft squadrons deployed to the Gulf. Two Marine tank companies transitioned from the M-60 series tank that they possessed to the much more modern M1A1 Abrams during their stateside predeployment training. Upon deployment to the Gulf, they attacked with the lead elements of Second Marine Division. In one night engagement, one company of fourteen tanks destroyed an Iraqi armor battalion-approximately forty vehicles.

The only difficulty with Marine mobilization occurred with combat service support units. These units were so poorly manned in the active forces that reserve units were broken up and used as fillers. This destroyed unit integrity and left the commanders and senior officers of those reserve units without a challenging job (Aspin and Dickerson 67).

Conclusions.

Except for the Army, mobilization for the Gulf war went as well as could be expected. Some services, like the Air Force, utilized their Reserve Component no differently than active members. The Marine Corps made the most use of its Reserve Component but utilizing reserve units as fillers hurt morale. Without

the mobilization of medical reservists, patient care in CONUS Naval medical facilities would have been close to nonexistent. The Air Force's integration, management, readiness criteria and evaluation system of its Reserve Component is a model for all other services to possibly pattern their programs upon.

The Reserve Component came when called, went in harms way and showed each of their services and the Department of Defense that both laws, policies and perceptions must be changed to allow improved readiness and more effective use of this under utilized capability.

SECTION II. THE RESERVE COMPONENT TODAY.

All services have examined the numerous lessons learned from DS/DS. Today, the total force is a far superior component to our national strategy because of the experiences learned in the Gulf. Funding for programs, amidst scarce allocations are viewed in the context of fighting regional conflicts. Our military strategy is now based on such employment. Although our total force has altered its way of doing business, the component that is viewed in a much more positive light is the Reserve Component.

New Contributions To The Total Force.

Reduced manpower has caused the services to struggle in meeting all the missions inherent in the new national strategy. Functions not required for immediate force employment are being or should be transferred to the Reserve Component. General Powell said in Defense, 1992 that if you don't need the capability day to day, it belongs in the Reserve Component.

Examples of the types of units going into the Reserve Component demonstrates capabilities for a short, intense conflict are the ones planned to be retained by the Active Component. In 1968 the Army stated you can live on one half of your combat service support for 60 days. Place the other half in the Reserve Component. The Air Force has given the entire CONUS interceptor capability to its Reserve Component. The Navy has only enough medical personnel for its peacetime operational requirements. The Marines,

being the first to fight, have placed the total civil affairs capability in the Reserve Component. Civil Affairs missions though are only needed after the conflict has been stabilized.

The Reserve Component is ideally suited for these kinds of missions. Capabilities are not required day to day. Response time could be months vice weeks for these type units without severely impacting on the mission. The reserve structure has earned the confidence of the Active Component to have total capability in some functions.¹

Melding The Two Together.

Placing the combat service support into the Reserve Component seems prudent. All services need additional capability in combat and combat support should hostilities escalate beyond the regional contingency level. The challenge is always how to allocate missions and integrate both Active and Reserve capabilities to achieve maximum force projection effectiveness.

The Marine Corps will be hard pressed to execute more than forward presence without mobilizing reserve combat units. One half of its tank capability, one fourth of its artillery capability and one third of its assault amphibian vehicle capability does not wear the eagle, globe and anchor on a daily basis. DS/DS saw these type units mobilized in their entirety. Integrating these two components cannot be done on the battlefield. Both components must attend the same schools, use the same doctrine, be assigned to each others' component, train together and use the same readiness evaluation system.

SECTION III.

HOW OUR RESERVE COMPONENT IS MEETING THE CHALLENGE.

Congress Leads The Charge.

¹The Air Force Reserve prefers not to have 100 percent of any capability in the Reserve Component to preclude frequent mobilizations to support routine crisis. Weapons system support is also more difficult and costly if not carried in the active force inventory and logistics tail.

The National Defense Authorization Act for 1990 and 1991 directed the Department of Defense to review the operation, effectiveness and soundness of the Total Force policy. While this policy was being reviewed, Desert Shield gave both congress and the Department of Defense a first hand look at exactly how Total Force policy was being implemented in an actual deployment. A DoD response was presented to congress on 31 December, 1990. In January and February, 1991 both congress and DoD viewed how effective Total Force policy was in the employment of our forces during Desert Storm.

Although victory in DS/DS was both swift and thorough, congress rejected DoD's report in total and tasked an additional study be conducted by Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC's). While this study was being undertaken, the services began to implement new policies of their own and request changes in legislation.

THE U. S. AIR FORCE: Build On Success.

I stated previously that mobilization of the Air Force for DS/DS was the most successful of all the services. There were challenges though, that the Air Force is taking steps to solve in the short term and also in anticipation of a changing future environment.

Part of the reason for Air Force mobilization success was the high percentage of prior service enlisted personnel in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. These highly skilled airmen and women only need to maintain their skills in reserve units vice learn them. Prior active service has broadened their backgrounds in overseas deployments and working within and with other units. For Operation DS/DS, the ratio was three out of four members of the Air Force Reserve Component were prior service (AFR 8).

As with all the services, Air Force active duty strength will drop. Initially, this will be a potential windfall to the Reserve Component units with more prior service members from which to choose. In the long term, with a smaller Active Component base, there will be fewer potential prior service applicants. The Air Force expects the ratio to fall to one in two Reserve Component members having prior service experience by the year 2000. This will

degrade the readiness of reserve units (AFR 8).

Air crews will show a similar drop. Most units now have a waiting list of former active duty pilots and crews wanting reserve affiliation. As the Air Force reduces its active crews, the percentage of Reserve Component crews with active duty experience is expected to drop from the current eighty-five percent to eighty percent by 2000 to 65 percent by 2005 (AFR 9). Although crews will still be capable of manning aircraft, will they be as ready to fly combat missions in weeks as they did in DS/DS?

The Air Force made extensive use of volunteers to augment their low mobilization ceilings for DS. This provides a double benefit in that a unit gets personnel who want to serve and the unit need only accept those it needs. These personnel also do not count against any mobilization ceilings. This concept was so successful that some Air Force gaining major commands are making use of individual volunteer preconsent agreements. An Active Component command can plan in advance that these individuals will volunteer to augment the unit, even without the President exercising his call up authority (Michael Killworth XII).

Killworth is quick to point out that taking individuals that volunteer to serve has associated problems. If the Air Force takes the volunteers and employs them in anticipation of a crisis, the unit they belonged to will have shortfalls if it is later mobilized when the crisis escalates. Unit integrity is lost. Additional fillers would have to be found to flush out the activated unit that is itself trying to establish its own unit integrity. This problem could snowball on down the line. Additionally, if a gaining command depends on volunteers from the Reserve Component to meet a crisis situation, the individuals have no legal responsibility to volunteer. Support for DS/DS was high because casualties were initially non-existent. Would volunteerism be as prevalent if significant casualties were sustained at the outset of the crisis?

Killworth also points out that over reliance on the Reserve Component can threaten or negate the concept of citizen soldiers, due to its impact on their

civilian lives or careers. Reservists have legal reemployment rights if they are mobilized. These rights are a controversial issue if one volunteers. A reserve member cannot be expected to volunteer for each minor crisis that the gaining command perceives his or her services may be required. This would most certainly impact on his civilian career.

The Air Force is certainly in the forefront of attempting to improve on its already effective use of its Reserve Component. In section IV, I will provide a plan that makes all these initiatives unnecessary. The Department of Defense and Congress, not the Services should make integration of Active and Reserve Components more efficient.

THE U. S. ARMY: It Continues To Struggle.

The Army had the worst mobilization performance for Operation DS/DS. National Guard pentagon planners became hostile when I mentioned their infamous brigade that never left the National Training Center. It must be pointed out that the Army has both mission and personnel challenges that the Air Force does not have. The Army Reserve and the National Guard are attempting to preclude outside forces from determining how they should integrate Active and Reserve Components.²

The Army has two principle challenges to overcome that none of the other services experience. The first is one of absolute size. The Army Reserve Component is as large as its Active Component. Although there have been initiatives recently proposed to reduce the Army reserve, they met stiff political opposition.³ It is a monumental task just to manage, equip and train such a large force. Exacerbating this challenge is our constitutional tie to a state militia. Nowhere is this a more emotional issue than in the

²The Army Reserve has principally combat service support units to augment the active forces. The National Guard has more combat and combat support units that are designated to reinforce active commands. I will address both components as one entity.

³Congress has resisted DoD's attempts to reduce the Reserve Component by adding funds to the Presidential budget specifically earmarked for reserve end strength.

Army. States demand a voice in both the size and composition of its reserve component and every state has a piece of the pie. Shaping the Army reserve component to meet a DoD plan is most difficult.

The second unique and significant challenge is the size of an Army "unit". The Army must mobilize its Reserve Component in large blocks to make a contribution to warfighting capability. Conversely, the Air Force can mobilize five to seven personnel and get a C-141 or C-5 crew. The five to seven personnel may never have seen each other before but can effectively function as a crew. The Army mobilizes by battalion and brigade. They employ in the same size units. Thousands of personnel that can function harmoniously must be mobilized together. A platoon of tanks requiring sixteen people or a battery of artillery requiring eighty cannoneers cannot be employed alone like a C-5 crew. Platoons of tanks and batteries of artillery are required for any mission. The majority of these personnel, in the combat units, are lower ranking enlisted at varying stages of skill development and therefore they could not function as a part of a coherent whole without additional training. The grade structure in combat service support units is only slightly higher.

The Army is taking steps to overcome these challenges. The first step is to prioritize what units will be needed first and providing those units with increased resources. Although training days are currently limited to the same statuted days of both drill and annual training duty, these units will have priority of personnel readiness, new equipment receipt, school quotas and training facilities. These are called VANGUARD units in the Army.

This plan has merit but also has drawbacks. Prioritizing resources within a static or decreasing budget means some units will receive less than they now do. Their readiness will fall even lower than it may presently be. If it is a National Guard unit, states will most certainly object. In an environment of uncertainty and change, what scenario do you prioritize against. In the case of DS/DS, water purification units were a high priority whereas in the reinforcement of Europe, they would've been a low priority. Establishing priorities will be difficult both politically and strategically.

The second reorganization the Army is studying is the size of units in the Reserve Component that can be mobilized together to augment gaining commands. For the reinforcement of Europe, the Army focused on brigades. This involves three to four battalions of combat, combat support or combat service support organizations that employ as a trained entity. This allows active division size units to have two active brigades (a significant force in itself), and one roundout or reserve brigade. The Army and congress are studying a concept of lowering the roundout concept to battalions. This would require active gaining division size units to now have three brigades of only two battalions each, anticipating a roundout battalion from the Reserve Component prior to employment.

This plan also has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is the more rapid planning factor for a smaller reserve unit to meet a readiness standard for employment. It is estimated that a reserve brigade takes 128 plus days to achieve a deployable readiness posture. For a battalion, the time shrinks to less than 90 days or two thirds the time (Rand 123). The negative side of this proposal is that the gaining division now has no brigades ready for immediate deployment vice two in the brigade roundout concept. The three or four brigades it has all lack the one roundout battalion.⁴ A brigade is a much more formidable force than three ad hoc battalions.

As in the case of the Air Force, congress and DoD can assist in this endeavor. Policy and law change can enhance roundout efficiency. The Army is trying to prepare for efficient mobilization in spite of congress and DoD vice with their support.

THE NAVY: What Do They Want?

The Navy's success in DS/DS was primarily due to the mobilization of individuals vice units. The Navy activated and deployed to Southwest Asia fewer reservists than any other service. The Navy activated 20,000

⁴This same concept holds true in combat support and combat service support.

individuals, or about fifteen percent of its Reserve component, with half the total being medical personnel. The other half were cargo handling and construction units (Seabees).

The challenge the Navy faces is what to keep in its Reserve Component, except for medical and Seabees. The Naval reserve has little equipment. Doctors, nurses and corpsmen are mobilized for their skills, honed sharp, utilizing equipment housed at their civilian places of work. The Navy has little equipment for its seagoing occupations to train on, or man, in case of mobilization. Unless these reservists live near the ocean and a Naval base, getting them to a meaningful training site is both time consuming and costly.

In my opinion, planned solutions are weak at best. The Navy plans to place up to thirty-five of its older FFG-7 frigates in the Reserve Component and man them with an active and reserve crew mix. To maintain a ship in an "active" status, the crew mix must be at least 50 percent active. This is terribly expensive in terms of active duty manpower. Additionally, these frigates have a limited mission capability (protection of shipping) and are vastly inferior to the Aegis destroyers the Navy now has in its inventory (Rand 202). Utilizing extensive active duty manpower to maintain a combatant that will be inferior to the platforms in most navies it faces, is not wise. Reservists, training on these old frigates, would be hard pressed to transition to the modern Aegis platforms in time of crisis. I feel this move is only to justify Naval reserve end strength at 142,000 and avoid fights with congress over which district takes cuts.

In section IV, I will outline a more viable plan for the Naval reserve. With ship construction time measured in years vice months, the Navy needs to not be concerned about having a reserve manpower pool to man equipment that will have to be constructed during reconstitution. The Navy should concentrate on medical and logistical reservists.

THE MARINE CORPS: Just Need More.

The only challenge for the Marine Corps is to equip its Reserve Component with equipment that is both compatible and as lethal as that contained in the

Active Component. The Corps is projected to draw down to an Active Component strength of 159,000. Our Reserve Component will be required for any mission beyond forward presence. Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia found us in a position of having no civil affairs personnel in the Active Component, although they were the most required.

As the active forces draw down, some equipment is freed for use by the reserves. F-18's, from deactivated active squadrons, are now in the hands of reserve squadrons. Wise expenditures of National Guard and Reserve Appropriations (NGREA) funds and congressional funding additions have added AH-1 TOW cobras and new KC-130 tankers. A-4's have been replaced by AV-8B's, the same attack aircraft flown by the Active Component.

The ground side is lagging far behind the aviation community in providing front line equipment. Fifty percent of the Marine Corps tank assets are in the Reserve Component. However, to date, only two of seven reserve tank companies are equipped with the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The new artillery fire control systems are being slowly fielded to our reserve artillery regiment. This regiment has twenty-five percent of our total force cannons. Navigation equipment and night vision goggles are only sparsely fielded in our Reserve Component. Without these equipment upgrades, active and reserve ground units are unable to fight side by side.

SECTION IV. WE CAN DO BETTER

HELP FOR ALL THE SERVICES.

The individual services can do much to enhance the capabilities of their respective Reserve Components but both congress and DoD can take steps to facilitate the services efforts. Some laws currently on the books dealing with mobilization have outlived their usefulness. New laws need to be instituted. Three initial steps that need to be taken immediately to assist all of DoD are neither politically sensitive or significantly add to our shrinking defense budget.

Redefine The Selected Reserve

In the first section, I identified a selected reservist as a member who belongs to a unit, conducts either 24 or 48 paid drills annually and participates in a period of active duty for training of at least fourteen days. The problem with this definition is it prohibits recall of a most numerous and highly trained manpower pool, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The most common initial service obligation contract now written is for a period of eight years. The common length of service mix for average skill recruits (tank drivers, infantrymen) is four years active and four years inactive reserve. The active/inactive mix for more highly skilled recruits (airplane mechanics, flight crews, nuclear) is a longer period of active service with a corresponding decrease in inactive service obligation.

A tank mechanic, an infantry squad leader or a beach and port noncommissioned officer is the most qualified, due to schools and experience the day he leaves active duty. If mobilization was required two months after discharge from active duty, he or she would be a much more valuable mobilization asset than a drilling non prior service asset on their initial tour. One only has to imagine an aircraft carrier flight deck petty officer, KC-130 navigator or Aegis cruiser sonarman, unable to be recalled by his service unless partial mobilization is authorized, and a relatively new recruit is doing his or her job. If there is an active duty shortfall, wouldn't an IRR member be the most desired filler? Why break up a selected reserve unit by pulling this needed skill when it is readily available in the IRR?

My recommendation is to change the law and authorize services to recall up to twenty-five percent of their authorized 200,000 Presidential call up from the IRR. The services in turn would better manage their IRR knowing that they were authorized to draw a small percentage from this manpower pool. A sonar technician released from active duty within the previous eighteen months is probably an outstanding mobilization candidate. By year three he is probably no longer a viable candidate due to both his questionable physical

condition and degradation of technical skills.

The services spend both time and money managing their growing IRR population when they need to concentrate on recent active duty discharges in the last eighteen to twenty-four months, with annual screening and frequent contact. Services could target just the hard core skills they need. The remainder of the IRR could be tracked by a much more cost effective mail system, infrequently, to support partial or total mobilization.

Another advantage to this change in law would be to not preclude members of the Reserve Component from being mobilized merely because they were not affiliated with unit. Often a reserve member must remove himself from the selected reserve due to temporary civilian job conflicts. The Marine Corps has a policy that forces reserve members from drilling status after several tours in a unit to allow all reservists a chance to serve.

This change to law is neither politically sensitive or cost prohibitive. It would benefit both the services and the reserve community. With our Active Component gradually shrinking, this pool of previously trained and often highly specialized individuals can no longer be considered a lower priority than selected reserve by Title 10, USC 268(b).

Institute Stop/Loss Upon Mobilization.

This concept was discussed during section I and is now provided as the second general recommendation. If a crisis requires mobilization, it requires the retaining of our experienced noncommissioned and junior officers. Invoking this authority should be simultaneous with mobilization. This policy would add no additional expense to the cost of the conflict since additional recruits or mobilization of the Reserve Component could be curtailed. Again, this adds approximately 17,000 highly trained leaders to the ranks of our fighting forces each month.

Assign Each Service A Portion Of The 200,000 Call Up.

The services should not be authorized call up of all personnel immediately but they should each know what to expect by stages to refine their deliberate

planning processes. The Air Force, for lift, should possibly get its entire lift requirement immediately. Army VANGUARD units should get a similar authorization to begin training. The services should then be allowed to call up personnel as they can accommodate their activation, training and movement.

During the Persian Gulf conflict, VANGUARD units could have commenced training by August 10th for movement sixty days there after. Figure 4-1 shows the impact of an early planned mobilization by reserve forces where figure 4-2 shows the effects of a delayed mobilization. We must remember, our new defense strategy calls for simultaneous deployment to two major regional contingencies. We must plan for Reserve Component units going to any major regional contingency so there will be remaining Active Component units to initially deploy to a second contingency, should it arise.

INDIVIDUAL SERVICES

THE AIR FORCE: More Missions For The Reserve Component.


Sections II and III described a very successful Active/ Reserve Component mix. Further down sizing will force the Air Force to assign proportionately more missions to its Reserve Component. Every mission assigned to the reserves, frees up additional manpower for the deterrence and forward presence missions. With the cold war over, the Air Force can concentrate on its crisis response and reconstitution missions with its highly skilled Reserve Component.

Strategic Bombers: A Possible Match.

Colonel Don Hessenflow of the Office of Air Force Reserve, The Pentagon, stated that experience base is the most important factor in the Air Force Reserve. He further stated that over eighty percent of Air Reserve pilots are employed by the airlines. Commercial aircraft are not high performance fighters. They are large transports. Strategic bombers are large transports with a different cargo than people or machine parts. With former President Bush's decision to stand down our nuclear bombers from twenty-four hour availability, we have a perfect opportunity for Reserve Component crews.

AC/RC Assignments if M-Day = C-Day

- Based on:
- Scenario's EAD & EAC unit timing requirements
 - Estimated unit preparation times and average transportation times




Arroyo Center

TABLE 4-1

AC/RC Assignments if M-Day = C+20

- Based on:
- Scenario's EAD & EAC unit timing requirements
 - Estimated unit preparation times and average transportation times



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TABLE 4-2

Some percentage of the strategic nuclear bomber mission, as well as tactical bomber missions, can now be transferred to the Air Force reserve. The percentage will have to be examined in detail but sufficient Active Component manning for the deterrence mission and some crisis response capability would be all that is required on active duty. Some additional standup time may be required to meet the stringent standards for nuclear delivery.

It is understood that a B-52 or a B-1 is not a DC-10 or 747. A Reserve Component bomber crew would not have to learn or keep current on how to fly large bodied aircraft but only keep current on the particulars of the type aircraft and tactical mission assigned. Strategic and tactical bombers, like CONUS interceptors, can be assigned to reserve crews.

A more detailed analysis by both manpower and operations specialists needs to be done to not only determine how much of the bomber force can be placed in the reserve but also to determine if associated units can also be placed in the reserve. Refuelers, ordnance men, and associated support squadrons may all be possible candidates. The Total Force concept has the most potential of working smoothly in this service due to the nature of systems, mission, the associated civilian occupations and the professionalism shared by both active and reserve members.

THE U. S. ARMY: On The Right Track But A Tough Fight.

This country needs a more robust ground combat force than the twelve infantry/armor divisions currently projected for the Active Component. The Army Reserve Component must have viable combat units that can be mobilized and capable of fighting in theater at day seventy. The structure of the Reserve Component must be changed to accomplish this.

The first step the Army must accomplish is a complete analysis of what type and quantity of units it requires to meet its most pressing mobilization requirements. If these units are needed prior to day seventy, they should be included in the Army's portion of the 200,000 presidential callup. If they do not meet that criteria, the Army must be prepared to do battle with individual

states to either place those units at a reduced funding level and force states to contribute if a higher readiness level is desired. If state legislatures and U. S. representatives want these units so badly, state vice federal funds must be resourced. The U. S. Army does need a Reserve Component but Army leadership must realize that present Reserve Component end strength must come down. Establishing priorities will be a problem as I mentioned before but everybody can't deploy simultaneously with the lift that is available. Therefore, all units do not have to be at the same state of readiness.

The concept of roundout brigades should be abandoned in my opinion. This is too big and too complex of an organization to be manned on anything less than a full time basis. Battalions can be kept at a reasonably high state of readiness and can be quickly trained up to a deployable posture. This will be tough on the reserve structure because regiment, brigade and division commanders will no longer be required in near their present numbers. Associated staffs can also be greatly reduced. Remaining will be primarily warfighters from lieutenant colonel and below. The administrative and political structure, the clout of the Reserve Component, will not die easily.

It must be a gradual process but units located close to CONUS based active divisions should transition to the type of unit required to roundout the units stationed there. Texas might be saturated with tank crewmen and mechanics, Louisiana with cannoneers, California with light infantrymen. Additional operations and maintenance funds would be targeted to these units so they can train with their gaining command whenever possible. Upon mobilization, the active brigades would deploy with their two or three battalions, as rapidly as possible on available lift, while its reserve roundout battalion trained up to standard, probably on the base the brigade just left. The roundout battalion would join the brigade when transportation was available or training completed, whichever was achieved last.

If DoD requires states to pay all costs for the "militia" they require but pay all costs for the units it needs, congressmen may be less likely to complain about how many and what type of reserve units in their

districts/states. Coupled with the prioritizing or VANGUARDING certain units, the Army can have a viable Total Force that is now manageable. Units can train up to a deployment status as rapidly as there is available lift to transport units to theater.

THE U. S. NAVY: Stop The Smoke And Mirrors!

The Naval reserve, although less than 150,000 is just too large in my opinion. A third of the strength is all that is required unless the Navy reduces its active forces and places capable platforms in the reserve. Medical and construction reservists should make up about seventy-five percent of those retained. This mirrors what was actually called up during DS/DS.

The Navy's use of medical reservists was optimum for both the reservist and the Navy. Vice sending reservists to theater, they were sent to CONUS medical facilities to backfill for active duty personnel deploying to man hospital ships or establishing field hospitals. This allowed active duty members to serve in an element they were most familiar with (duty with Marines, aboard ship), while providing an environment for reservists to work where they were most familiar, a fixed CONUS facility. This had the unexpected added benefit of having mobilized reservists teach the remaining hospital cadres the latest in hospital administration and surgical techniques. Same day surgery, home recovery and increased out patient care have remained at CONUS hospitals due to the training by mobilized reservists (Patricia Diggs).

Mobil Construction Battalions (Seabees) should also remain in the naval reserve. During deterrence or forward presence, there is only minimal need for the construction of port facilities, ammunition dumps ashore or road networks. Employment into any theater except Europe, will find these type facilities few or nonexistent. As General Powell stated, "if you don't need it every day, it belongs in the reserves".

I feel the at sea billets that the navy needs to retain in its reserve forces should not be for outmoded frigates but amphibious and logistical lift. A surge in sealift is the key element in making crisis response occur. The LST

1179 class is reaching block obsolescence and could be retained in the reserves vice the FFG-7's. These ships do not have to be a capable, modern warfighter. They only need to accomplish the mission they were built for-- lift forces. These same reserve sailors could also man cargo vessels in the ready reserve fleet to compensate for our shrinking merchant marine force. True, keeping the skills of a reserve amphib sailor living in Des Moines, Iowa would be a challenge but much less so than a sonar man or fire control technician on an old FFG.

If the Navy elects to place some of its carriers or submarines in the Reserve Component, they would have priority over lift. If the conflict is large enough to warrant mobilization, more surface combatants will be needed to keep sea lines of communication open. The challenge of keeping nuclear powered ships in a less than full up status requires innovative ideas.

The Navy does not need to marginally add to its combat capability. It needs to significantly add to its lift and ability to project forces from the sea. It needs to abandon the fact that even old combatants are more glamorous than amphibians and accept the fact that mobility, both at sea and ashore, fit best in our new defense strategy.

THE MARINE CORPS: Just Need To Keep Modernizing.

I will not spend a lot of time on my Corps because we, like the Air Force, devote significant resources to our Reserve Component. We have active duty cadres called Inspector-Instructors down to company and separate platoon level. A reserve tank company also has an active duty captain and seven enlisted to administer, train and conduct the necessary housekeeping functions. This enables the unit to train for combat on drill days. We require our reserve component for crisis response and will continue to expend necessary resources to keep it effective.

We do need to modernize some ground units in our reserves. We require M1A1 tanks, Light Armored Vehicles, troop support equipment and communications gear to make our Reserve Component compatible with its active brothers. Budget reductions, vice increases, will not allow any easy solutions.

THE COAST GUARD: An Unknown Factor.

I have omitted the Coast Guard from the first three sections because the Coast Guard does not know what capabilities it desires from its Reserve Component. There is intense internal conflict in this agency so it would be imprudent for me to make recommendations.

It seems to me that since the Coast Guard performs similar missions both during time of peace and war, such as harbor patrolling and ship monitoring, their Reserve Component could easily augment its Active Component. Until the Coast Guard decides what it wants and needs, I cannot make service specific recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

Face The Facts!

Not only DoD, but this nation must accept the fact that some mobilization of reserve forces will be required beyond any military operation except a show of force. Capabilities such as combat service support, field medical and surge lift are embedded in our Reserve Component. We may not have to reach the level of Israel, where every male between eighteen and forty-five is either active, reserve or tied to a defense industry. We do need to accept that a 1.6 million or less standing military is insufficient for us to execute the role the world places upon us--the chief of police.

History Is Our Yardstick.

Both World War I and World War II were wars to end all wars. We were ill prepared for the start of both. EAGLE CLAW (Desert I) occurred when we were at our low point in military readiness. Desert Shield/Desert Storm occurred when we were well prepared from the biggest peacetime buildup in history. We cannot assume the demise of the former Soviet Union means war is over. DS/DS occurred after the end of the cold war. We can never send our sons, and now our daughters into combat poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly led, like we have done at the initial stages of so many past conflicts. We must measure our present capability against force readiness of the past. Victory can be

swift with minimal casualties if the nation is ready; long and costly if it is not.

Our Reserve Component Will Fight.

We will again go into harms way. We must have a true Total Force to achieve victory. We can never allow an adversary to even consider that victory over any American military force is a remote possibility. To do this, we must always win the first battle. Whether it be active or reserve forces, an initial loss only prolongs and escalates the cost of final victory.

THE TOUGHEST CHALLENGE: THE DECISION.

All of these recommendations are useless unless the National Command Authority has the courage to make timely decisions. If intelligence points to an emerging foe with a military capability that may exceed our own, reconstitution must begin. If the intelligence worsens, forward presence must increase. If it is decided that the crisis threatens our vital interests, we must begin mobilization. Our crisis response lift posture for both the Air Force and Navy must be activated. We must roundout our active Army brigades with reserve battalions. We must man our training bases and begin to increase accessions. We must be ready to win that first battle with our Total Force.

My recommendations are not cost prohibitive. Except for Army reserve units, the plan is not politically sensitive. What these ideas are meant to be is additional insurance policy for the mothers and fathers of America, that loan us either our active or reserve warfighters, to insure the best chance of seeing both victory and their children, when the crisis is over.

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